S TUDIES O F T H E political geography of the
Gulf usually highlight the potential political instability that arises from lack of properly defined boundaries. both offshore and onshore. Swearingen (1981) for example states, 'A political and cultural legacy from the past, the absence of boundaries today is a specter of instability haunting the Gulf. This is especially true in the Lower Gulf. Except for that between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, none of the boundaries between the various emirates has been demarcated; nor have those between the United Arab Emirates and Oman' (Fig. 1) . The cultural legacy from the past is explained as follows: 'As many scholars have noted, the concepts of precise territorial delimitation expressed by boundaries is relatively recent in the Gulf region. Allegiance. traditionally, was to a social unit: jus sanguinis rather than jus soli operated'.
The object of this paper is to see how far such an explanation is valid. This will be attempted through a study of the local notions of territoriality amongst the tribes of south-east Arabia. However, in view of the fact that many of the problems of defining inter-state boundaries developed out of deciding who owned what in the desert forelands of the core areas of settlement, the main emphasis will be on the concepts of territoriality in the nomadic fringe. and in particular in what was known as the Trucial States or Trucial Oman, now United Arab Emirates.
In the course of study it is hoped to show that the distinction between jw sanguinis and jus soli is far from clear cut and that social organization is largely based around notions of territoriality. The fact that these notions are in part related to the functioning of the traditional local economies and that more than one group may exploit the different natural resources of the same area does not mean that notions of ownership or exclusive access to resources are any less developed than in our own societies: it is just that they are different. Indeed, one anthropologist, writing of the ideal type of pastoral Arab society (in Cyrenaica) maintains that their genealogy is fundamentally a 'conceptualisation of a hierarchy of ordered territorial segments' (Peters, 1960) , whilst -,D r John Wilkinson is a lecturer in the geography of the Middle East at the School of Geography, Mansfield Road, Oxford, and a Fellow of St Hugh's College. This paper was first presented in March 1982.
Fig. I . Location map
another (Dresch. 1982) in the context of Yemen states. 'In short, the names of tribes are geographical categories of great stability'. At the same time we must realize that this does not mean that tribes are ecologically determined: a purely functional approach to understanding tribal structures and values will not progress us far in understanding the traditional notions about territorialism in our area. The fact, for example. that certain Iranian tribes may treat pasture as an alienable right whilst ours do not, can neither be explained in terms of 'vertical' versus 'horizontal' nomadism, nor in such general cultural values as Islam. It is, of course, impossible in a paper of this length to investigate in detail the relationship between geographical organization and the translation of territorial notions into the tribal conceptual framework of which both Peters and Dresch speak. But certain basic concepts of ownership and functional control of territory will be examined and in this way, perhaps it will be demonstrated that it is as dangerous to assume that a notion of jus soli has only developed with the modernization of the Gulf as it is to assume that it is more strongly developed among settled peoples because nomadism is an earlier, more primitive state.
As will be indicated in the conclusion, some boundary problems have in fact been resolved since the withdrawal of the British because of a return to something of the old tribal concepts of land organization. After all, the European stance about central government's exclusive sovereign rights over territory was effectively only enforced in our area with the culmination of the so-called Buraimi dispute in the 1950s. and it produced some unfortunate fragmentation of territory, notably in the eastern Trucial States (Wilkinson. 1971) . The fact that something of a rerour en arriere may produce agreements that do not accord with the norms of international law, which in fact very largely derive from 'Western' notions of territoriality. does not necessarily imply that they are any less settled than a demarcated boundary. Our own history provides frequent examples of violated international frontier agreements too.
Notions of ownership: formal and informal notions of nomads and settled tribesmen
Basic to the concept of a dlir (tribal territory)* are the notions about ownership in the society concerned. Here a starting point can be obtained from an examination of certain fundamental ideas concerning land organization in the shari'a. However far the full, developed formalizations of Islamic law may sometimes remove themselves from the reality of actual practices, there is, normally, at the core of the precepts involved, a basic element related to the traditions of a particular period: the shari'a as Brunschvig states (quoted Linant de Bellefonds. 1959) 'est fille, bon gr& ma1 grk, de la rkalite sociale'. A fortiori is this the case in the Ibidi madhhab of Oman where the vast corpus of rulings concerning practical matters has very largely been harmonized with the local 'rtrf (customary law). Much of this material from the ninth century onwards is extant, either as direct rulings or in the more formalized recensions of the exemplary problem-answer pattern of the Encyclopaedists (cf. Wilkinson. 1978a Wilkinson. : 1979 .
The fundamental Islamic injunction concerning nomadic rights, and one which clearly derives from traditions going back into pre-Islamic times and is still the basis of the legal philosophy of nomadic societies in our area today, is the reputed hadith (saying of the Prophet) 'Man holds three things in common. water, vegetation (kalli') and fire'. The emphasis is quite clearly on basic natural resources as is evident both from the transforming of the term 'earth' which occurs in the more 'elemental' concept of common property in certair? pre-Islamic Middle Eastern societies to the utilizable product of natural vegetation,"* and from jurists' commentaries where fish (in their natural environment) and game are added to the basic list of commonly owned resources.
:Is natural resources, the ultimate dominiurn (ownership) remains with the Creator, the uti!e (use) is the common heritage of mankind. However, because the availability of these resources is limited and can give rise to competition, the basic problem that must be resolved is to what extent and under what conditions can these resources be appropriated.
Full appropriation is accepted as virtually a sine qua non for permanent irrigated cultivation, and this is recognized in the Islamic laws governing the creation of allodial rights, t~zrtlk. The features recognized for such appropriation derive largely from the fact that intensifying the use of the resources which God gave to man requires the input of man's labour, in bringing in water or draining marshland and preparing the land (Sfiiwardi, 1915 : 380) . Cultivated trees and crops are granted full ownership rights, as, tctcr, water supply from the point where it becomes artificially derived. The question of the land itself, however, is more complicated. In permanent cultivation where the land is utilized for most of the time, as in the case of perennial crops, mulk is also granted. In seasailally irrigated land, or more importantly the rain-fed land, the situation becomes more complex, partly because the land is often exploited on at least a partially comnlunal basis ( m~u h d ' , mushtarak) , and partly because of the seasonal cultivation and fallow systems which involve grazing rights. Here Islamic law, in so far as it exists on the subject, is almost entirely based on custom, as is indicated by the very words used to designate dry land farming, ba'l associated with the male god of fertility (Ba'l, Ba'al, Bel. Baal) or 'aththari deriving perhaps from his southern hypostasis Ishtar (E.I.?. Art. Ba'l)or possibly his female consort Ashtoreth (Babylonian Ashtor). Even more vague in Islamic law (Linant de Bellefonds, 1959 ) is the law concerning communal non-cultivated land, which in the Ottoman code of 1858 was designated as matriika.
Sometimes also called by a variant, dira, in our area. It is relevant to note that ddr has the connotation of movement around a node. This nodal concept, which is discussed further on. also explains why the inhabitants of these main settlements are designated halfahl) al-ddr by the bedu. Note that the spelling 'bedu' has been used for the desert nomads of our region whilst the correct badw has been retained for the wider connotation of Ibn Khaldun's tribal society as explained later.
" Kald' may have been pared down in the course of legal discussion to 'trunkless' natural vegetation. i.e.. annual fresh herbage. As such it corresponds with the bedu term 'ishab (correctly ' w h b )and contrasts with 'trees' as discussed later on. Originally it was. perhaps, conceptually an all-embracing category, as suggested here. 68 f f . ) (ibci al-mawat) by the first exploiter (Fig. 2) (Poliak, 1940) (Sperber. 1978) . The resulting sterilization o f land resources eventually led to important modifications o f Ibadi law concerning abandoned land in seventeenth century Oman (Wilkinson, 1977: appendix (Wilkinson, in press) (i.e, to buy, sell, inherit, rent, etc.) 
The reason is that basically Islam looks from the centre o f the village outwards

and the customary boundaries as a result have been well understood since time immemorial*, so that the problem o f formalizing this aspect o f land ownership is o f little importance. Again the apparent difference between the nomads and the settled disappears when it is realized that nomads have precisely the same view o f ownership rights as the villagers in the domain o f cultivation. Their essential concern is to obtain such rights and there are few bedu tribes o f the region who do not actually own considerable portions o f villages, even if they may use clients to do the cultivation itself. Indeed, it is effectively a prerequisite o f creating a ddr to have such a foothold in settled land. The concomitant o f ownership, which is the right to alienate property
however, is constrained by social mores: the essential feature to note here is that there is little difference between the settled and nomadic tribes in this situation and everything is done to prevent property passing to outsiders. The fact that clan notions o f social structures are common to both the nomads and the villagers also means that whilst their concepts o f tribal relationships are based on balanced oppositions (the famous Hinftwi and Ghftfiri moieties), their economic structures are based, to a degree, on cooperative principles; hence their irrigation systems are termed falaj, with a communal distribution system, and much cultivation is joint (mushtarak),even though the actual ownership o f elements o f production are theoretically divided between individuals. In this, perhaps, we can see something o f the contrast between the mushli' (communal) principles o f
* Indeed, the conventions concerning the limits of the two systems of land use even formed the basis of the treaty in Late SasBnid times (sixth century) between the Persians and the Arabs, reflected in the territorial concept of the Persian province of MBzun (Wilkinson. 1973). cultivation as practised by settling tribes in the Fertile Crescent and the individualistic patterns of land tenure which some see as characteristic of the true peasants of the region (cf. Scholz, 1975 for discussion of the literature).
The potential conflict over grazing (which involves kala', 'ushb) and wood-collecting rights from naturally growing trees, has also been eliminated through time. The formalized rules specifically state that the latter cannot be owned (mulk) but are the possession of the community treasury (bayt al-rndl). As such, the produce, whether in fruit or wood, of a standing or fallen non-cultivated tree, and of cultivated trees which have established themselves outside the gardens proper, are reserved for the poor of the community (al-Scilimi : 416-419 et passim). However, such a ruling is simply a reinforcing of the inner view backing existing practices and has been formalized to protect the interests of the poor. It is not law for the sake of law. Land law in Oman tends to arise only when there is a real situation to be regulated. This is the reason why, for example, there appear to be no formal rulings in IbBdi law about whether or not kali' is common property when established in mulk land (as is discussed in other madhhabs) because such legislation would be redundant. The reality is that nomadic groups regularly move into village lands in summer in the piedmont zone. The mountain shawciwi herders do likewise within the villages in the mountain zone, and they usually have a special tree (al-bariza) there which marks their gathering place and where guests are received. These shawciwi, however, are much more closely integrated socially with their villages than the nomads and it is the range of their grazing lands which tends to determine the boundaries of the settled tribes. so that the whole of inner Oman as well as the desert is also divided into a patchwork of tribal dcirs. Conflicts over 'nomadic' grazing grounds can therefore involve villagers in tribal conflicts even though not directly involved by their immediate interests. More important however, is the conflict they can get involved in when the shawciwi, as transporters of goods, meet rival groups in certain of the big centres of Oman. Because of such potentialconflict, specific points have clearly to be recognized as the boundaries between various groups where changes in carriers have to occur: because of such complications certain neutral bedu tribes have tended to develop a specialized role as carriers between the villages, e.g. the B. Zufayt section of the B. Qitab fulfilled the vital role of linking the Sirr ('Ibri area) to its port at Khibura before the settled Hawasina managed to build up a quasimonopoly of control over this route.
The nomadic viewpoint; mixed herders.-Despite the apparent harmonization of ownership and territorial rights between nomads and settled in Oman, the fact remains that, in contrast to Islamic law which tends to take the village centre as its viewpoint, the nomad's life starts in the desert and his viewpoint is strongly influenced by the basis of his economy. pastoralism. So the emphasis swings back from that of the cultivator, where full dominium is the starting point, to that of the right to control the natural resources, the dominium utile. This is why the nomads of our region tend to use the word haqq, (pronounced hagg), right, to indicate the possessive rather than the word mal. property. used by thk settled population (e.g, k g g i and mali = mine). But the problem is how to obtain precedence in haqq. The basic rule is the same as that of reducing mawcit into mulk, the first to do so. But instead of it being the first to vivify the land (ihya al-mawat) it is a case of istila, the first to take hold of it. This, as is also the case with much cultivation, is simply a case of possession being nine points of the law. But there remains the issue of the tenth point: how does one establish right in the first place? And here we must go back to another hadith, less well known that the one already quoted, indicating the traditional viewpoint: this effectively states that surplus water may not be refused in order to prevent a pasture being exploited. As in rights of thirst, the water must be given (subject to certain conditions) and not sold. The essential feature to note here is the parallel association of water and grazing rights. Without water. grazing (normally) is of no use. So just as there is a village grazing area associated with the irrigated area, so there are grazing rights associated with water supply.* Moreover, the water supply in the desert can be owned (even if belonging to a The Balush. for example, have a grazing dispute with the B. Oitab because they claim that in buying the falaj of Jabal Musharib they acquired the feature itself. group rather than an individual) because usually it has to be developed by man. So the haqq rights follow the mdl rights. This is essentially the significance of the use of the word bida' to mean a well by the Trucial Coast nomads. Bida' is not the generic word for a well-that tends to be fawi amongst the settled or just md' amongst the nomads-while there is a mass of specialized words indicating characteristics of specific wells: as the etymology of the word indicates, a bida' well is innovative, it opens new land and confers new rights to its owner (hence the fact that it is normally associated with the name of its owner or builder, often a shaykh, and marked with his proprietal wasm). So we can see that private ownership is an essential starting point of nomadic territorialism and that there is very much a jus soli involved in their society. It also emphasizes one of the essential features of land exploitation by the nomads, that of nodal development. So the basic pattern of tribal rights has developed around the exploitation of the water resources of an area. Since the wells have different seasonal potential they give access to a particular grazing resource.* Amongst the shoat (i.e. sheep and goats) nomads, animals do not become water independent at any season, and so their territories are usually small and more or less confined to the mountain terrain. All other groups possess camels and the degree to which these predominate largely determines the size of the ddr. If they are basically a mixed shoat-cum-camel economy, the territories will tend to follow the drainage system with a 'pulsatory nomadism' (Johnson, 1969) . The most intense occupation will be upstream where water and grazing are best, but when the seasonal grazing is good the camels will be able to exploit the outer fringe of the territory hattd dkhar ddr, up to their tribal boundaries (gasahurn)**. In the outer parts of the drainage courses there also lie other resources which are again the rights of the tribal group; such for example is the collecting of salt and sulphur (used particularly in a paste for delousing animals) from the playa of the Umm al-Samim or the halokinetic series associated with incipient salt domes of the QHrat al-Kibrit and QHrat al-Milh in DurG' territory. Hunting also, it should be remembered, is the main source of meat for many poorer groups, while the collecting of plants for dyes and medicinal purposes can provide an important supplementary means of exchange too. Trade in firewood is sometimes of considerable importance, whilst certain groups, e.g. the A1 BCI ShHmis, specialized in making charcoal from the acacia bush (samra) which dominates much of thesayh (outwash, bajada zone) vegetation. All these natural resources are deemed to be tied to territorial rights. But the main physical determinant of the territory is the drainage system and in the desert foreland of the Oman mountains tribes will define their territory and the rights of sub-groups in terms of wadi courses. In fact so inherent is this notion that nomads will give directions solely in terms of upstream and downstream even though the fcreigner may see nothing but a totally flat plain (jidda). ** * Camel-herders.-Where nomadism is based on the use of the camel alone, the animals are far less water tied and may even become water independent when fresh grazing is particularly good (Stein, 1967 , quotes 25 days for the Shammar, whilst Wilson, 1978 , writing of exceptional years of grazing in the gizu ('ushb) of Southern Libya quotes periods of several months of water independence and camel displacements of 600 km for it). This means that the animals can exploit a far greater range of * The permanent wells of the Dura' for example are referred to collectively as 'idd al-Duru', but individually will be referred to as fawa so-and-so. Buhuth is a widely used word amongst the bedu of our region for a seasonal well dependent on rain and is the equivalent of the western tribes' mishdsh. Amongst the sand-dwelling camel nomads the characteristic 'ugla is a shallow well (length of the 'agdl, head-rope) normally dug into dunes to reach the perched water table: strictly. it is a sub-classification of a mughila, which is any well of permanent water which has to be dug out when resumed. * * It is of interest that my Janaba informant designated tribal boundaries not in terms of legal lines (hudud)but in the concept of a frontier, qasa. a word whlch has the connotation of the most distant point, the area of greatest remoteness, of least interest. * * * Amongst the southern nomadic tribes of Oman. e.g. the Janaba, upsteam is 'Aldya and contrasts not with the settled tribes Sifdla (Upper and Lower Somewhere) but with Hadar. Hence the Barr al-Hadri is the South Coast, the ultimate drainage direction of the wadi system of S.E.Oman. By extension 'alwa can mean not just upstream, but nearer to the speaker. desert than the shoat-cum-camel herders. This is why they tend to be occupiers of the sand desert with its very particular hydrological characteristics but with a sparse grazing which is virtually useless for shoats. Another aspect of the different grazingibrowsing habits of the nomads' domesticated animals is that the camel herders can use territory within the domain of another group without necessarily conflicting with their interests. That is why. for example. a group like the 'Awamir of the Oman desert appear to have no exclusive ddr. Apparently 'most strongly imbued with an inconsequential wanderlust' (British Memorial. 1955: i, 58) , they in fact have perfectly clear movements and established grazing preferences and are certainly in no way clients of the tribes whose land they utilize: on the contrary! In reality their example simply highlights another basic feature of tribal territory in Oman. non-exclusiveness. Exclusive ownership of land is strongly developed in the oases because permanent cultivation is not possible without continuous control of the resource base: seasonally cultivated or seasonal grazing resources can be used in a complementary fashion between groups. In the nomadic domain the use of the land depends on the type of grazing, quality and quantity of water supply, and the type of animal they exploit. Land use is therefore essentially complementary and territory non-exclusive. The tribal area is a functional rather than a formal political region (cf. Soja. 1971 ) and the boundary is reflected in terms of social groups with exclusive access to an economic zone rather than a sovereign ownership of territory by a tribe (cf. the parallels in the law of the sea). Since exploitation of marginal resources also requires increasing specialization, the frontier area of economic territory is of least interest to the occupying specialist society but may be of interest to another specialist group. Hence complementarity of occupancy by small groups. apparent lack of exclusiveness and a seemingly 'inconsequential wanderlust' characterize the desert areas of our region and the problem of drawing a modern boundary in terms of European notions of sovereign rights largely arbitrary. On the other hand. such a limited ecological explanation of tribal territory only explains part of the picture and as we shall now see there is a notion of sovereignty involved in control of the land even if it is not based on exclusive ownership.
Demographic control: sovereignr):
Because the nomads with which we are dealing do nothing directly to 'manage rangeland'. the pattern of land use essentially stems from the characteristics of the domesticated animals employed and the technology of exploitation. So it can be seen that regulation of land and notions of territory primarily derive from mobility, which in turn involves the organization of land in time schedules (Carlstein, 1980) adapting to differential carrying capacity, both intra-and inter-annually. This essentially involves demographic control, both of the animal units and of their human owners.
Because the technology of exploitation and the characteristics of domesticated animals used by the nomads are fixed, but the carrying capacity of the land varies continuously, demographic manipulation is an essential functional feature of territorial control for pastoral societies. Detailed study of the relationship between carrying capacity, the minimum size of herd units and of human units in the seasonal cycle, and the pattern of social fusion and fission that result exceeds the scope of this essay (cf. discussion in Carlstein. 1980: Ch. 4) . So too does the zonal equilibrium which results from balancing the centripetal forces of competition for optimum conditions and the centrifugal forces stemming from the different tolerances of various domesticated species to water and salt economies reflected in terms of yield economies (Wilkinson, 1977: Ch. 3) . What is more essential to this discussion is the effect of inter-annual variation in herd composition. As Swift and others have noted (in Chambers et al., 1981) . 'many communities have mechanisms for coping with the normal pattern of the season, but they have much greater difficulty in coping with climatic variability'.
Thanks to the recent disasters in the Sahel many are now, in some measure, familiar with the kind of cyclic situation in animal populations which occur in arid regions, even if the relationships between bad rainfall and herd sizes are far from simple. What is perhaps less familiar is the time lag involved for domesticated species in herd reconstitution. Even though a bad year will affect camels somewhat less than shoats (the drought of 1947148, for example. killed off one-third of the camels against half the shoats belonging to the Megarha of the FazzBn: Cauneille, 1954) . the latter have a natural reproduction rate of 30-40 per cent p.a. whereas camels have a doubling time for the fertile and potentially milk-producing females between 15 and 50 years (Dahl and Hjort, 1976) . The effect of a drought such as that of 1 9 5 M 2 which killed off in the order of three-quarters of the camels of the Rwala (Lancaster, 1981) would. therefore. prove disastrous without major re-adaptations or mechanisms for control of, or access to, alternative resources and population.
Such continuous living on the verge of a natural disaster by the camel herders, coupled with the fact that their animals are eminently stealable and that the herding groups tend to live in small, isolated, and therefore potentially weak units, doubtless played a determining role in their development of a strong sense of 'assabc~a(group cohesiveness expressed in clan obligation terms), the systems of redistribution of wealth, whether by raiding, gift, or loan, the warrior ideology as perhaps reflected in their poetry, and the sense of superiority to shawdwi (shoat herding) groups (cf. inter alia Sweet, 1965; Bonte. 1975; Cole, 1975; Copans, 1975; Wilkinson, 1977: Ch. 3; Meeker, 1979) . It also plays a role in demographic control. During field work amongst nomads of the Oman region I noted, without at the time giving the matter consideration, that individual settlements never seemed to be made up of a single clan unit or vice versa. Furthermore each settlement appeared to divide between a social core and peripheral population, but the complete core, as reflected in the name of the dominant clan, appeared almost inevitably to be spread over a number of settlements. One aspect of this situation is obviously connected with the relationship of weak or client groups to a dominant one associated with protection, and is familiar to anthropologists. But there may also be a demographic aspect, to coin a phrase 'disposable population', involved in the phenomenon. This suggestion obviously needs further research but it does seem a reasonable mechanism whereby a tribe can maintain a core population, identified in clan relationships of dominant groups, in control of all the main points of natural resources and demographically geared more or less around the carrying capacity of a reasonably expectable bad period. In good periods client population can be absorbed, and conversely forced out when the going becomes really bad. Beyond a certain pressure, however, migration of the core group must also take place and new resources must be gained. Since the climatic conditions necessitating these moves will be at least regional in scale and also affect settled peoples, such movement becomes cumulative and can give rise to the kind of political migrations familiar in the history of Arabia, and certainly characteristic of the history of the Oman region. Here the migration movements tend to come and go via that part of Eastern Arabia (more or less the Has$ region) called by the classical Arabic authors 'al-Bahrayn', and to a lesser extent on the other side of the Empty Quarter via Southern Arabia; further movements take place across the entrance to the Gulf between Oman and what again was classically known as 'Kirman'. Also associated with demographic patterns, perhaps, is migration to East Africa. But these are macroscale movements which surpass the scope of our essay. At the more local level the pressure of the nomads is towards the richer areas and this in itself leads to a slow and complex current of people moving from group to group, with shifts between nomads, settled and shawdwi groups, and of political shifts in dependent clans and independent tribes. Such movements are familiar in theory, even if not studied in any detail, and, clearly, partly function in order to maintain demographic equilibrium in areas where the economic resource base in uncertain.
Similarly related to demographic control and intimately connected with notions of territorialism is the practice of khuwa. As Lancaster (1981) in an excellent study of the institution amongst the Rwala points out, it is not extortion, nor is it protection money, nor a tax, nor bribery. It is payment to opt out of the primary economy of raiding as practised by the dominant groups of the desert; thus a client group could graze without the risk of being raided. Although the Rwala do not see the payment as a rent because they insist that they do not 'own' the resources, it can be interpreted as being such and it is treated as an alienable right by both parties to the contract (cf. Lancaster, 1981 : 122) . But more important, and of this they are now at least openly aware thanks to the 'nationalizing' of grazing grounds, it is also an important regulatory feature by which the dominant groups can manage the grazing resources of the desert and it is clearly another example of 'disposable population' by which a tribal group can control, in some measure, the problem of variability in the ratio of herds to carrying capacity. Fission and fusion can regulate the pattern of seasonality but 'rule' is required to deal with the much greater problem of inter-annual variability. That is why the terms 'rule', 'own' and 'dominate' become synonymous amongst the major nomadic tribes. But they also draw a clear distinction between these concepts on the one hand and 'government' on the other (Lancaster. 1981:121) : the latter is associated with the concept of h u k m , law, arbitrat~on. * This government-rule dichotomy coupled to the notion that resource control was exercised through dominance rather than ownership is the key to understanding the notions of territoriality amongst the nomads and their relationships to central government. The actual territory the tribes control is largely determined by the distribution of resources necessary for their life styles: the number and social organizations of other occupants, however, is fluid and is not confined to the dlir of the dominant group since their rights are based on the exploitation of surplus resources, possibly from a number of dars. But in all groups the socio-political boundaries are intimately linked with resource exploitation and closely related to natural features. Territories therefore fluctuate both areally and in time, and are complementary rather than exclusive. Furthermore the concept of rights of ownership or control of resources is closely associated with utilization, so that rights lapse with abandonment. But this apparent fluidity and impermanency in concepts of territorialism should not be confused with instability or lack of roots in place. To use a Braudelian form of analysis, tribes know histoire ivinementielle since their structures can be manipulated by shaykhly and religious elites for political ends, but their structures, although apparently rationalized into a clan classification d o not actually respond to laws of 'consanguinity' but to 'customs' and 'obligations' (Eickelman, 1980; Dresch, 1982) . These constitute a code of behaviour whose rules are largely geared to maintaining stability in geographical organization, an organization that itself is often of great longevity. Part of the occupying population of a tribal territory may therefore be fluid and transgress its boundaries according to available carrying capacity of the units of economic organization: but whilst the potential for political manipulation may be correspondingly fluid and elites come and go, the tribe as such is quasi-permanent.
The argument that in simple economies political groupings tend to identify in terms of social units. whereas in the industrialized world political territory tends to define the social identifications, can therefore be seen to be something of an over-generalization when we come to examine more closely territorial structures of such 'simple' societies. It has a degree of correspondence with the rather simplistic Marxian evolution of the 'Asiatic' mode of production and state formation: nomadic community -tribal society -despotic centralized government (Tosi. 1976) . What is clear is that it is not a question of jus sanguinis versus jus soli, but that such a division becomes meaningless in cases where the basis of the community is largely determined by the need to maintain viable economic units in ecological harmony with the land. This leads us on to a final set of considerations, what is the community and how do different elements in its leadership deal with the question of resource allocation.
The communirj: religion
In our initial discussion on the ownership of resources it was obvious that the notion that natural resources are communal property had to be modified if there was competition for them. One obvious such limitation was that of substituting the oecumene, in our case the dar al-Islam, for the generic 'Man' of the hadith: thus Mawardi (p. 401) glosses it as 'Amongst Muslims, three things are held communally.. .' * Traditionally this was the role of the shaykhly and relig~ous elites: in the Sa'Gdi case the 81 Sa'Gd, and the Wahhsbi qadis. In the modern state (Cole. 1975) this has had to be extended so the government now divides between the hakims and qadis (the ruling elite) and the dawla, (administration).
However, what that Muslim community is may be interpreted in at least four major ways in the Gulf, depending on whether one is Shi'i, Sunni, WahhBbi, or Ibadi. In the Wahhabi case the theory conceives all those who have not become brethren (Ikhwan) by accepting their call to the Unity of God (da'wa ila 'I-tawhid) as guilty of shirk and apostates (Helms, 1981 : Ch. 2): such people live outside the dar al-Islam and, ipso facto, have no territorial rights. The appeal of such an ideology is clearly going to be to those who wish to cast off an existing regime or who have strong expansionist tendencies. The resulting tie to the House of Sa'fid may initially, at least, be of secondary importance for adopting their creed. It is no coincidence, for instance that there were two groups attracted by this ideology in the Omani region, the Jowasim (correctly Qawasim) and part of the nomadic fringe; '...when there came the madhhab of 'Abdul-Wahhab al-Najdi it was particularly successful with the bedu (a'rab) ignorant peoples living in the deserts outside the settled oecumene (ah1 al-buldan) who are the people of excellence and true learning (al-fadl). And when the Wahhabi state faded away, many of them who had become Wahhabis became Sunnis ...' (Sira Nasir b. Abi Nabhan, a treatise of the differences between Ibadism and other religions from the middle of the nineteenth century). Wahhabism simply joined a line of other ex-Bahrayni'majdi ideologies, such as that of the Qaramita (Carmathians) and earlier still thk extreme Khawarij groups, known as Najd~ya, who also believed in a religious transformation of the bedu notion of hijra by which one moves out from the rule of a 'tyrant' and declares those who d o not join you to be your enemies. With the passing of these movements, the Omani frontiersmen had lapsed into Sunnism and joined the growing band of opponents of the Ibadi regime, which from the tenth century A D onwards had increasingly become identified with the tribal structure of central Oman. In other words the frontier tribes identified their independence of the core through subscribing to Sunnism, or, when neighbouring 'al-Bahrayn' was powerful, in the current ideology uniting that region.
Ibadism by contrast was ideologically the complete opposite of Wahhabism. Based on quiktist principles of reform from within the community, it pragmatically recognized other Muslims as ah1 al-qibla (believers) under 'tyrannical' or non-constitutional leadership (jubbdr). In times of expansion their fight was to restore the true Muslim community by overthrowing those involved in tyrannical rule and unjust behaviour (ah1 al-baghi): but always under the condition that other Muslims are considered as believers and that their property is inviolate (Wilkinson, 1976; .
In this briefest of discussions of the three main Islamic ideologies affecting our region we can immediately identify certain associated social-cum-territorial relationships: the Omani core of settled tribes associated with Ibadism, the peripheral tribes asserting their independence via Sunnism and a nomadic fringe opportunistically tending to identify with expansionist 'heresies' emanating from the neighbouring regign of 'al-Bahrayn'. Shi'ism and its associated Ja'fari law is largely absent from our region, although very important elsewhere on the Arab side of the Gulf, where it is associated with settled, non-tribal peoples-peasants, and to some extent, urbanites.
A religious interpretation of what constitutes the community therefore, is one way of defining and narrowing community rights to resources. Its complement was the nascent state where power was based on shaykhly control of centres giving access to essential resources. Let us look at this in the particular context of pearling and the marine environment.
Nascent states: nodal control of access to resources
Resources of the sea are very much treated as public domain: furthermore the shore constitutes an extensive harim (integrated border region) attached to it of 500 dhra' (cf. 40 dhra' for a well, and 300-500 for a qanat: Kitub Manthurat al-Ashyakh: Ch. 35). Certainly there is no question of establishing exclusive territorial rights over the pearl banks, and the concept of carving up the sea bed in order that the resources can be 'owned' by a particular 'state' and their exploitation alienated to foreign oil companies is a pure European imposition. But as explained elsewhere (Wilkinson, 1977: 20-25) this does not mean that there was no concept of territorialism involved. The community which had access to the pearl banks was ex silentio the inhabitants of the Gulf, and in many areas every able-bodied man went pearling, including nomads. Here, incidentally, we must again guard against preconceived notions about noble and non-noble occupations in the Gulf tribes. Nomads went fishing. pearling, helped with agriculture, carried wood and hewed salt along with any other poor peoples: the distinctions in Gulf society were between rich and poor, not between noble and non-noble occupations. Along the Trucial Coast pearling was an essential occupation of many nomads.
Access to the main pearl-banks, however, could only occur by joining the local fleet, and this tended to fish in the adjacent water of its home port. Crews might be recruited from family units and boats fishing together might be associated on tribal lines. But the organization of the basic fishing calendar and the settlement of disputes was operated by various rnajlises (councils), largely drawn from prominent nawkhudhas (mariners) and members of the merchant class which provisioned the boats and bought the pearls, under the aegis of the shaykh of the home port. The possession of such a pearling port was one of the main features that raised a shaykh into a ruler's status, allowing him to collect conventional taxes from the pearl merchants who financed the pearl industry, as well as from the individual crews: in the same way he would collect taxes from the fishermen who operated along the adjoining coast. Conversely, full tribal territorial independence was only possible by ownership of such a port, since pearling along with other maritime activities, coupled to pastoralism and cultivation, formed the economic trinity of tribal life in the Trucial Coast, linked by a series of complementary seasonal migrations. An independent port gave independent access to the sea's resources and so completed the control of resources necessary for political independence. Hence the identification of ports with nascent states, an identification which was accorded (selectively) full political status by the British. In this way the discovery of fresh water lenses in the small coastal dunes of Abu Dhabi island in the 1760s meant that the western Bani Y i s and allied tribes under the A1 Bii Falah could break away from Dubai, hitherto the most westerly port on the Trucial coast (Wilkinson, 1971) . The full development of Abu Dhabi's independence also involved establishing a firmer agricultural base than that of the Liwa, by gaining control of part of Tuwam, (i.e. the Buraimi oases) one of the main centres of the settled economies in the piedmont zone of the Oman mountains. Control of these two nodes of Abu Dhabi port and al-'Ayn oasis in Tuwam therefore ensured the Al Bu Falah and their immediate tribal followers not only of a secured economic base, but also extended their tribal influence into a complex network of alliances, ranging from the nomadic Manasir and 'Awamir of the desert fringes to control of the local Hiniwi groupings involved in the Hinawi-Ghifiri moieties which 'balanced' tribal power in settled Oman. Thus, the nomadic element in the fringe of northern-Oman as far as the Qatar Peninsula was integrated and orientated towards the territorial structure of settled Oman. For this reason the nomadic tribes of the region consider themselves to be Omani in contrast with the 'Western' tribes orientated towards the oases of eastern Arabia, i.e. 'al-Bahrayn' and their political structures.
!Ver~,orks.-In the foregoing discussion it is clear that one of the essential features involving territorial independence of the tribe is the network of relationships operated by its leaders through control of crucial points in settlement organization. In spite of the fact that camel-herders can more or less live on the produce of their animals for long periods, nomads are not basically economically independent since their very specializations involve them in exchanges and services which link the whole desert community (cf. Wilkinson, 1978b) . Their economic survival depends on their establishing some relationship with other groups whilst their political survival frequently demands the use of outside arbitration in their disputes. Their notions of territoriality cannot therefore be divorced from that of the other inhabitants of the desert and its periphery. Indeed, the very notion of possession of territory starts at the interface with the domain of the settled peoples, for it is here that their resource base is richest. Movement tends to be outwards towards a desert periphery, which forms the outer edge of the tribal dar. It is a fundamental error to view the core of the desert as the homeland of the nomad: it is this kind of thinking which has led to some extremely curious views about the origins of Islam and many meaningless discussions about whether it is a desert or urban religion. The distinction that must be drawn is that between two social structures, those which Ibn Khaldun labelled badw and hadar. Hadar is the organization of a central government system operating through an ur6an network and controlling a rural hinterland from which derives most of its wealth. It is the system which operated in the conquered lands and the values of its urban-based elite constitute hadariya, civilization. Badw is not bedu but tribally organized society whose elite operates from oasis settlement and whose power derives from manipulating 'kinship principles to regulate marriage, social interaction and the redistribution of power, force, wealth and benefits' (Khuri. 1980: 1) .Exchanges are essential to the use of resources of this environment and the nomads (a'rab) provide the means for that exchange as well as some of the produce. They are therefore integrated into badw society and, through their role in the supply of transport and cavalry, may have an influence greater than their numbers would suggest. More significant is the projection of their concept of honour on to tribal society in general, a viewpoint that makes the values of 'umrdn al-badw the counterpart of hadariya. But the real power resides in the control of the nodes of exchange and here there are two networks which are all-important, that of the shaykhly elite. whose power as arbiters (hrikim) stemming from the manipulation of customary tribal law may be reinforced 'by adoption and adaptation of the religious piety and science of Islam ('ilrn); and the merchant network which organizes exchange and the loyalties of whose membership cuts across ties of tribe, religion and state, and so permits the 'internationalization' of the resource base in a world where central government, in the hadar sense, is precluded. Nomadic concepts of territory must therefore be viewed simply as part of the total organization of badw society, a society where notions of tribal honour sometimes involving a certain unwritten jus sanguinis, may be used to manipulate the sedentary peoples by means of tenurial agreements and a pseudo-sharika system,* deriving in part from a written j r~r soli, but only in those places where there is a clear division between tribal and non-tribal society as instanced in Bahrain island (Khuri; . Such separation into two laws becomes meaningless where the society itself is predominantly tribal and it is the tribesmen who themselves exploit the main economic resources of the region. This is the case in the Oman region and indeed, numerous other parts of the Islamic World, contrary to general belief that settled agricultural societies cannot be tribal. In such areas sanguinis and soli are simply two aspects of a common jus,just as directum and utile derive originally from a central concept of dominium in the origins of our own law.
A reversion to traditional concepts of territory?
The application of European principles for determining national territory to societies which conceived of territory and resource exploitation in a very different way is largely responsible for the ridiculous political fragmentation of territory on the Arab side of the Gulf, and the consequent divorce of frontier zones and core areas, so that oil occurs in countries with the least potential for development. The inability of these countries to absorb their oil revenues lies at the heart of OPEC's strength and its success in converting control of the market from a consumer monopsony to a supplier monopoly. We are indeed paying dearly for encouraging the fissiparous tendencies in the tribal conceptualization of society, rather than developing the potential for fusion inherent in notions about communal ownership of resources.
Recently there has been something of a reversion to these old concepts, at least by the wealthy members of the Gulf community (perhaps because they can afford it). A number of boundary issues seem to have been resolved to the local satisfaction on the principles of non-exclusive ownership of territory, that may be parodied as the old Arab principle of 'my house is your house' (bayti baytkum). The kind of unorthodox settlement of disputed land in the Eastern Trucial States, whereby Shaykh Zgyid of Abu Dhabi simply bought the disputed zone to build a house on, again illustrates the kind of 'unorthodox' solution favoured locally, and which Swearingen sees as unstable.
* 'Partnership' contracts which in fact are not on an equal fiduciary or risk-bearing basis and hence do not conform to the true Islamic notions of sharika (Firestone, 1975) . They are particularly characteristic of pearling in the Gulf (Rumaihi, 1980) , so that in some circumstances tribesmen, as well as the non-tribal categories. may also be enmeshed by debt mechanisms.
Similarly, once the British withdrew and stopped conducting the foreign affairs of its protege states, many of the problems between them were simply resolved on mutual understanding between the local rulers. Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, and to some extent the Sultanate of Oman. have all come to something of an understanding about disputed zones, even if the nature of their understanding is not publicly stated, and may be only partial. Such agreement may even have as much chance of survival as if a boundary were staked out upon the ground. International law in the Gulf is what the national rulers of the area consider to be acceptable practice. and this is partly based on their own notion of territoriality as much, if not more. than our own. After all in the lifetime of a man like Shaykh Ziyid of Abu Dhabi it was only for a short span that Europeans could enforce the concept that a man's written word was more legally binding than his spoken.
